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INTRODUCTION
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide United
States citizens the protection of fundamental rights under their
respective Due Process Clauses.1 These fundamental rights
†
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1
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (finding “[t]he right to
marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from
ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era. Many
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and
honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are
disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law
and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State
itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is
then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same
legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and
diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (explaining “[o]ur opinions applying the
doctrine known as ‘substantive due process’ hold that the Due Process Clause
prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the
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likely include the right to informational privacy—the right to
keep one’s personal information private.2 The claim that the
right to informational privacy is fundamental is further bolstered
by recent United States Supreme Court cases finding that
personal data, such as email and social media, accessible through
a mobile device, require a heightened level of constitutional
protection.3
The government intrudes on the right to informational
privacy when the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
invokes the border search exception to conduct warrantless
searches of United States citizens’ mobile device data at the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” (emphasis in
original)); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating “[t]he [Due
Process] Clause also provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests,” including, but
not limited to, the right to marry, the right to direct the education and upbringing of
one’s children, the right to marital privacy, the right to use contraception, and the
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 15.7
(last updated May 2019) (“Today the Justices of the Supreme Court will apply strict
forms of review under the due process clauses and the equal protection clause to any
governmental actions which limit the exercise of ‘fundamental’ constitutional
rights.”).
2
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977) (“The cases sometimes
characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different kinds
of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”).
3
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (“We decline to grant
the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier's database of physical location
information. In light of the deeply revealing nature of [cell site location information],
its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic
nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party
does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. The
Government's acquisition of the cell-site records here was a search under that
Amendment.”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Modern cell phones are
not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may
reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life,’ . . . The fact that
technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not
make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders
fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.” (internal
citation ommitted)); see Atanu Das, Crossing the Line: Department of Homeland
Security Border Search of Mobile Device Data Likely Unconstitutional, 22 U. PA. J. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 205, 239 (2019) (“Although the U.S. Supreme Court has opined that
the Border Search Exception has limits without providing further guidance,
established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and recent U.S. Supreme Court case
law provides the guidance that may require CBP officials to obtain a warrant based
on probable cause prior to conducting a border search of mobile device data. Failure
to do so would likely be unconstitutional.”).
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border.4 The border search exception doctrine states that a
government official or law enforcement officer can conduct a
warrantless search of a person and his belongings when entering
the United States at the border to determine whether the person
can legally enter the country or is carrying contraband.5

4
Emanuella Grinberg & Jay Croft, American NASA Scientist Says His Work
Phone Was Seized at Airport, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/
02/13/us/citizen-nasa-engineer-detained-at-border-trnd/index.html (“Facing the risk
of detention and seizure of his phone [Bikkannavar] turned it over along with the
PIN. He waited in a holding area with other detainees until CBP officers returned
his phone and released him.”); see also Amended Complaint at 2, Alasaad v. Duke,
No. 1:17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2017) (explaining “CBP and ICE have
searched the mobile electronic devices of tens of thousands of individuals, and the
frequency of such searches has been increasing. While border officers conduct some
searches manually, they conduct other searches with increasingly powerful and
readily available forensic tools, which amplify the intrusiveness and
comprehensiveness of the searches . . . . The effect of searches of mobile electronic
devices on individual privacy and expression can hardly be overstated. Travelers’
electronic devices contain massive amounts of personal information, including
messages to loved ones, private photographs of family members, opinions and
expressive material, and sensitive medical, legal, and financial information. The
volume and detail of personal data contained on these devices provides a
comprehensive picture of travelers’ private lives, making mobile electronic devices
unlike luggage or other items that travelers bring across the border.”); Inspection of
Electronic Devices, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION https://www.cbp.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/inspection-electronic-devices-tearsheet.pdf (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018) (“All persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in, or departing
from, the United States are subject to inspection, search and detention. This is
because CBP officers must determine the identity and citizenship of all persons
seeking entry into the United States, determine the admissibility of foreign
nationals, and deter the entry of possible terrorists, terrorist weapons, controlled
substances, and a wide variety of other prohibited and restricted items . . . . You’re
receiving this sheet because your electronic device(s) has been detained for further
examination, which may include copying.”).
5
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977) (“This interpretation, that
border searches were not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth
Amendment and were ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of that Amendment, has been
faithfully adhered to by this Court.”); see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and
the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 319 (2015) (“Under [a] narrow approach,
the border search exception exists to allow the government to keep out items that
should be outside the United States . . . . The underlying right is to control what
enters . . . the country.”); see also Thomas Mann Miller, Note, Digital Border
Searches After Riley v. California, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1996 (2015) (stating that
an individual’s privacy interest in his digital data content needs to be balanced with
the traditional government interest of preventing people without a legal right to
enter the U.S. from crossing the border and preventing contraband from entering
the country); Das, supra note 3, at 209 (“The initial rationale of the Border Search
Exception doctrine justifies CBP officials conducting a warrantless search of a
person and the person’s belongings only to ascertain whether the person can legally
enter the U.S. and that they are carrying no contraband. These should be construed
to be are [sic] the metes and bounds of the purpose for a warrantless border search.”)
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The current administration has made it clear that securing
the border is one of its highest priorities.6 Border security in the
current administration includes securing the border both from
undocumented immigrants entering this country for a better way
of life and from terrorists who may want to cause harm.7 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) defines a terrorist as a
person with an ideology that includes committing an act of
violence against a country or its people for a political cause.8 The
current administration believes the search of a person’s mobile
device data, including data stored remotely but accessible via the
mobile device, can allow Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”)
officials to determine whether the person is a terrorist and to
permit CBP to detain the person, thereby preventing the person
from entering the country.9 The United States government also
attempts to restrict entrance by promulgating stricter border
security rules and regulations and by implementing detail
oriented vetting in the immigration process.10
DHS rules
6

S.M., Donald Trump’s Travel Ban Heads Back to the Supreme Court, THE
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
23,
2018)
https://www.economist.com/democracy-inamerica/2018/01/23/donald-trumps-travel-ban-heads-back-to-the-supreme-court;
Christina Wilkie & Tucker Higgins, Trump on Closing the US-Mexico Border:
‘Security Is More Important to Me Than Trade,’ CNBC (last updated Apr. 3,
2019, 7:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/02/trump-on-closing-border-securityis-more-important-to-me-than-trade.html.
7
Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court to Decide Legality of Trump Travel Ban,
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtimmigration/supreme-court-to-decide-legality-of-trump-travel-ban-idUSKBN1F82EY
(stating that the travel ban was one way the United States government hoped to
secure the border from terrorists masquerading as refugees to do harm to the United
States).
8
See Roberto Iraola, Terrorism, the Border, and the Fourth Amendment, 2003
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, *V.1 (2003) (“The border exception to the Fourth Amendment
provides the government with the necessary flexibility to detain and search persons
and goods in its endeavor to protect the mainland and its citizens against acts of
terrorism.”); see also What We Investigate: Terrorism, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/
investigate/terrorism (last visited Aug. 6, 2019) (“International terrorism:
Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with designated
foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored) . . . . [I]nspired by
multiple extremist ideologies[.] . . . Domestic terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals
and/or groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that
espouse extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental
nature.”).
9
See Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 4; see also Das, supra note 3,
at 210.
10
Trump's Executive Order: Who Does Travel Ban Affect? (Feb. 10, 2017), BBC,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302 (“All travellers who have
nationality of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are not permitted
to enter the US for 90 days, or be issued an immigrant or non-immigrant visa.”).
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promote this border security policy by likely unconstitutionally
expanding the border search exception doctrine to more than
determining whether a person can legally enter the United
States and whether the person’s belongings include contraband.11
The DHS rules use the border search exception doctrine to justify
expanding a warrantless border search to determine whether the
person is a terrorist.12 DHS personnel, including CBP officials,
as well as the courts, seize on the broad language of case law
pertaining to border searches to expand the limits of the border
search exception doctrine.13 This expansive application of the
doctrine gives CBP officials almost unlimited scope to conduct
warrantless border searches of a person and the person’s
belongings.14 However, the DHS and the courts have wrongly
interpreted the border search exception doctrine.15
The underlying rationale for the border search exception is
that it is reasonable to search a person and the person’s
belongings at the border without a warrant to determine whether
the person has a right to enter the country or is carrying
contraband.16 The border search exception doctrine views the
border or point of entry—that is, an airport or ship dock—as a
place for protecting both the nation’s sovereignty and the
person’s privacy.17 The border search exception doctrine should
11
See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for CBP Border Searches of Electronic
Devices, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/
border-searches-electronic-devices; see also Iraola, supra note 8, at I.6; Inspection of
Electronic Devices, supra note 4.
12
See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for CBP Border Searches of Electronic
Devices, supra note 11; see also Iraola, supra note 8; Inspection of Electronic Devices,
supra note 4; Motion to Dismiss at 3–4, Alasaad v. Duke, No. 1:17-cv-11730 (D.
Mass. Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
13
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 10.5(a) (5th ed. 2017) (“Any person or thing coming into the United
States is subject to search by that fact alone, whether or not there be any suspicion
of illegality directed to the particular person or thing to be searched” (citing United
States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1974))).
14
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 970 (9th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp.
2d 536, 570–71 (D. Md. 2014). These cases all hold that digital data content from
respective defendants’ electronic devices can be lawfully searched without a warrant
based only on reasonable suspicion.
15
See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (stating that “a
border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive
manner in which it is carried out,” thereby finding that CBP officials do not have
unbridled authority to conduct a border search for any purpose).
16
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925).
17
Id.; see also Miller, supra note 5, at 1992; Kerr, supra note 5, at 294–95 (“The
Supreme Court has held that a border search exception to the Fourth Amendment
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take into account both the threat from individuals attempting to
enter illegally or to smuggle contraband and that an individual’s
privacy interests are vulnerable to border security officials.18
Courts and some legal commentators have been reluctant to
impose any limit on warrantless border searches of mobile device
data or other electronic data based on the border search
exception doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.19 However,
framing warrantless border searches of mobile device data as a
governmental intrusion on a fundamental right, namely the right
to informational privacy, may shield mobile device data from the
CBP officials’ prying eyes. The Supreme Court has found that
the right to decisional privacy—to make certain decisions about
one’s life without governmental interference—is a fundamental
right and subject to strict scrutiny.20 However, the Court has
waffled as to whether the right to informational privacy is a
fundamental right subject to the same level of strict scrutiny.21
This Article argues that the right to informational privacy is a
fundamental right for three reasons.
First, the right to
applies to property entering and exiting the United States at the border, as well as
its functional equivalent, in order to protect the sovereign interests of the United
States in monitoring what enters and exits the country.”).
18
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 552 (1985) (Brennan,
J. dissenting) (explaining “[the Fourth Amendment] is, or should be, an important
working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to
check the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a
part of any system of law enforcement”) (quoting United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972)).
19
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13; see, e.g., Eunice Park, The Elephant in the
Room: What Is a “Nonroutine” Border Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches
Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 314 (2017) (stating “this Article urges that
such a [reasonable suspicion] standard provides the balance that is needed between
the critical interests of both law enforcement and the private individual”).
20
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 1 (“There is a fundamental right to privacy which includes
various forms of freedom of choice in matters relating to the individual’s personal
life. This right to privacy has been held to include rights to freedom of choice in
marital decisions, child bearing, and child rearing.”).
21
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 158–59 (2011) (subjecting the government
intrusion to the right to informational privacy to something less than strict
scrutiny); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (implicitly
explaining that any government intrusion of the right to informational privacy is
subject to strict scrutiny, but the Act in this case had a screening process to limit
materials that would be public based on whether it dealt with personal information
of President Nixon, such that it was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the compelling
government interest); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1977) (stating “[w]e hold
that neither the patient-identification requirements in the New York State
Controlled Substances Act of 1972 . . . is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any
right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).

2019]

UNLIMITED DATA SEARCH PLAN

299

informational privacy for mobile device data is equally as
important as the right to decisional privacy.22 Thus, if the right
to decisional privacy is a fundamental right, then logic follows
that the right to informational privacy also constitutes a
fundamental right.23 Second, recent Supreme Court cases have
held that mobile device data receives heightened constitutional
protection.24 Third, the Supreme Court’s rationale for giving
mobile device data heightened constitutional privacy protection
stems from the same Supreme Court jurisprudence that
produced the right of informational privacy.25 If mobile device
data receives heightened protection and properly falls within the
scope of the fundamental right of informational privacy, any
government intrusion into an individual’s mobile device data
which is not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental
interest would violate the Fifth Amendment.
Part I of this Article discusses a case in which a United
States citizen was subject to an unconstitutional warrantless
border search of his mobile device data. Part II explains the
history and current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence of the
border search exception doctrine. Part III explains the way in
which Supreme Court jurisprudence finds the right to
informational privacy for mobile device data to be a fundamental
right.
Part IV discusses the reluctance of some legal
commentators to find that a governmental intrusion on the right
to informational privacy is subject to strict scrutiny. Part V finds
that a warrantless border search of mobile device data is likely
unconstitutional for violating the right to informational privacy
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
22
Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption, 14.
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 953, 966–7 (March 2012) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600).
23
Id.
24
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
25
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating “with reference to Lord Camden's judgment in Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials, 1030: ‘The principles laid down in this opinion
affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than
the concrete form of the case there before the court, with its adventitious
circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employees of the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property . . . . In this regard the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.’”); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.
at 2223.
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WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A UNITED STATES-BORN CITIZEN’S
MOBILE DEVICE DATA BY AIRPORT BORDER SECURITY

In January 2017, thirty-five-year-old American-born Sidd
Bikkannavar was detained at Houston’s George Bush
Intercontinental Airport while returning from a trip abroad.26
During the conducting of customs and immigration procedures,
CBP officials insisted on searching his mobile phone data.27
Initially, he did not comply with CBP officials, as he worked for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (“NASA”)
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (“JPL”) as a scientist in Pasadena,
California, and his mobile phone data included confidential
information regarding his work for NASA.28 However, as CBP
officials clearly indicated that his mobile phone could be seized
indefinitely until he complied with their demands, Bikkannavar
consented for CBP officials to search his mobile phone data.29
Bikkannavar stated that CBP officials gave him a document
titled “Inspection of Electronic Devices,” which indicated that the
CBP had the right to search all people, baggage, and
merchandise arriving to, or departing from, the United States.30
Further, it indicated that such a search was mandatory and that
failure to cooperate could lead to the seizure of the mobile
phone.31 In addition, the rules indicated that border searches of
mobile device data sought to determine whether a person
entering the United States had a terrorist ideology and to deter
terrorists from entering the country.32
Ironically, Bikkannavar underwent two previous background
checks to determine his risk to national security.33 He went
through a thorough background check to work with confidential
information at NASA.34 Further, he had also submitted himself

26

Grinberg and Croft, supra note 4; see also Das, supra note 3, at 211.
Kaveh Waddell, A NASA Engineer Was Required to Unlock His Phone at the
Border, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2017/02/anasaengineerisrequiredtounlockhisphoneattheborder/516489.
28
Waddell, supra note 27.
29
Grinberg & Croft, supra note 4.
30
Waddell, supra note 27; see also Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 21–22.
31
Waddell, supra note 27.
32
Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 4; see Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 12, at 2–3.
33
See Waddell, supra note 27; see also Das, supra note 3, at 212.
34
See Waddell, supra note 27.
27
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to another background check as part of the Global Entry program
that allows officials to expedite customs procedures after a
fingerprint scan.35
In September 2017, several coplaintiffs, including
Bikkannavar, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), filed suit against the DHS in Federal District Court in
Massachusetts on the theory that warrantless border search of
mobile device data by CBP officials is unconstitutional under
both the First and Fourth Amendments.36 The plaintiffs did not
argue the warrantless border search of mobile device data was an
unconstitutional government intrusion of the fundamental right
of informational privacy under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. As discussed herein, had the plaintiffs made
such a claim, the court should find in their favor.
II. BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION DOCTRINE JURISPRUDENCE
The purpose of the border search exception doctrine is to
balance the sovereign’s interest in protecting the nation from the
unlawful entry of people and contraband against a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in his person and his
belongings.37 It allows CBP officials to conduct a reasonable
search, without a warrant, of a person and his belongings at the
border.38
The border search exception doctrine was first introduced by
the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States.39 In this 1925
case, law enforcement officers detained driver George Carroll and
searched his vehicle for liquor, which was considered to be
contraband during the Prohibition, within the interior of
Michigan, not near the United States-Canadian border.40 After
observing Carroll for months during a sting operation, the law
enforcement officers suspected him of transporting liquor
illegally such that, one day, the law enforcement officers stopped
35

See Id.
See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 11; see also Das, supra note 3,
at 212.
37
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); see Miller, supra note 5, at
1996; Das, supra note 3, at 209.
38
See Iraola, supra note 8, at *V.1.
39
267 U.S. at 154 (1925); see also LaFave, supra note 13 (stating that “the
United States Supreme Court did not have occasion . . . to pass directly upon the
question of whether routine searches of persons or things entering the country are
permissible under the Fourth Amendment” until Carroll v. United States).
40
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160.
36
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and searched the suspect’s vehicle and found several dozen
bottles of liquor.41 The Court found the law enforcement officers’
suspicion from the sting operation to be sufficient probable cause
to conduct a warrantless search of Carroll’s vehicle.42 Although
the case dealt with a vehicle stop, the Court stated that there
were several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement
for a warrant, including a vehicle stop and a border search.43
Chief Justice Taft, authoring the opinion of the Court,44
stated “the Fourth Amendment protects a person from
unreasonable searches and seizures” when law enforcement
officers fail to obtain a warrant.45 The Court found “it would be
reasonable to stop and search a vehicle without a warrant
because a vehicle can move out of the jurisdiction before the law
enforcement officer can obtain a warrant.”46 Thus, the Court held
that to search a suspect’s vehicle without a warrant is reasonable
if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to do so.47
Further, Chief Justice Taft went on to explain the border
search exception doctrine: “Travelers may be so stopped in
crossing an international boundary because of national
self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as
effects which may be lawfully brought in.”48 Thus, the border
search exception was born in the context of a vehicle stop and the
accompanying concern that a suspect may flee the jurisdiction
before law enforcement can obtain a search warrant.49 Moreover,
the Court explains that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which
will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights
of individual citizens.”50 Therefore, the rationale behind the
border search exception is that it is in the public interest to
ascertain a person’s right to enter the United States and to
41

Id. at 160.
Id. at 162.
43
Id. at 153–54.
44
Id. at 143.
45
Id. at 147–49; see also Das, supra note 3, at 217.
46
Id. at 153–54.
47
Id.
48
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154; LaFave, supra note 13 (stating that border searches,
since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered “reasonable” by
the fact that the person or item in question has entered the country from outside).
49
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; see also Das, supra note 3, at 217.
50
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
42
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search, without a warrant, to determine whether the person’s
possessions include contraband, because any suspect may flee the
jurisdiction prior to a search warrant being obtained.51
The DHS also uses United States v. Montoya de Hernandez
to justify warrantless border searches of mobile device data. In
that case, CBP officials at Los Angeles International Airport
suspected Montoya de Hernandez of smuggling drugs in her
alimentary canal.52 When they searched her, they determined
that she was wearing a girdle and elastic underpants lined with
paper towels—indications of drug smuggling; from this evidence,
CBP officials obtained a warrant to conduct a rectal search, after
which it was found that Montoya de Hernandez was indeed
smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal.53
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, upheld the
warrantless border search in that case because the “balance
between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of
the individual is also struck much more favorably to the
Government at the border.”54 Finally, the Court found “that the
detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a
routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception
if customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the
traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is
smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.”55
In contrast, Justice Brennan, in dissent, harshly criticized
the majority opinion, stating that the search and seizure of
Montoya de Hernandez were those of a police state and not
indicative of the freedoms and values of this country.56 With this
decision, Justice Brennan was afraid that overzealous officers
might circumvent people’s Fourth Amendment protections and
illegally search and seize them at the border.57
Although there have been invasive warrantless border
searches ostensibly justified by the border search exception
doctrine, as indicated by Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
border search exception doctrine only allows for law enforcement
officials at the border to conduct a warrantless border search to
51

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; see also Kerr, supra note 5, at 319.
473 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1985).
53
Id. at 534.
54
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540 (internal citations omitted); see also
Das, supra note 3, at 219.
55
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
56
Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 553; see also Das, supra note 3, at 220.
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ascertain whether a person can legally enter the United States or
is carrying contraband. Any more may be an unconstitutional
government intrusion on the fundamental right to informational
privacy, as discussed herein.
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE HOLDS THAT THE RIGHT
TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY FOR MOBILE DEVICE DATA IS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that
“[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”58 Supreme Court jurisprudence
dictates that fundamental rights stem from the Due Process
Clause.59 Further, the Court has deemed that fundamental
rights require heightened protection from any government
intrusion—for example, statutes, regulations, and government
agency rules—such that these intrusions are subject to strict
scrutiny.60 That is, the government intrusion must be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling government interest.61 The
Court has held that the constitutional privacy right is a
fundamental right62 and has separated it into two categories: the
right to informational privacy and the right to decisional
privacy.63 The right to informational privacy includes the right to
control the disclosure of personal information without
government interference.64
The right to decisional privacy
includes, among other things, the right to marry, the right to
control the upbringing of one’s children, and the right to certain
private intimate relations.65 The Supreme Court has held that

58

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
60
Id. at 721; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1283 (2007) (stating that government intrusion of fundamental rights is
subject to strict scrutiny, starting from Roe v. Wade).
61
Fallon, supra note 60, at 1284.
62
Lee Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 601,
602 (2006) (stating “a conceptualization of a central branch of the fundamental
rights doctrine [is] the constitutional right to privacy”).
63
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1977); see also Fan, supra note 22, at
966 (“From its start, informational privacy was linked to decisional privacy from the
common concern of state interference with the autonomy of choice.”).
64
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–99; see also NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138
(2011); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
65
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also Fan, supra note
22, at 959–66; Goldman, supra note 62, at 604–11.
59
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the right to decisional privacy is fundamental.66 However, the
Court has been less clear on whether the right to informational
privacy is as well.67
Characterizing the right to informational privacy as
fundamental would subject any governmental intrusion on one’s
right of informational privacy to strict scrutiny.68 Thus, the
governmental intrusion must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling government interest; else, the intrusion is
unconstitutional.69 Using warrantless border searches of United
States citizens’ mobile device data as an example of a
government intrusion on the right to informational privacy,
recent Supreme Court case law bolsters the constitutional
protection for mobile device data; this thereby elevates the right
to informational privacy with regard to mobile device data to a
fundamental right, such that a warrantless border search of
mobile device data should be subject to strict scrutiny.70
Further, a government intrusion can comport with one
aspect of the Constitution but violate another.71 For example,
although the warrantless border search of mobile device data
may be found to be constitutional under the border search
exception doctrine in view of the Fourth Amendment, the
warrantless border search of mobile device data can be found to
be an unconstitutional government intrusion on the right to
informational privacy under the Fifth Amendment.72
This
asymmetry is even more apparent when the constitutional
provisions at issue are the search and seizure provisions of the
Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
66
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); see also Goldman, supra
note 62, at 604–611; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1.
67
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04; Nelson, 562 U.S. at 159; see also Fan, supra
note 22, at 968–69.
68
Fallon, supra note 60, at 1269.
69
Id. at 1268.
70
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (discussing mobile device data).
71
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)
(explaining that an illegal search of a person is not simply a trespass but the “right
to be let alone” anywhere). Further, stating that if Fourth Amendment protections
are not available, the Fifth Amendment should protect a person’s privacy—“[i]n this
regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Olmstead was eroded to the point that it was overruled by Katz
v. United States, the case which provides the basis for modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence with Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy test. 389 U.S.
347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
72
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Amendment; these two rights can overlap such that when one
right does not protect a constitutional privacy interest, the other
may do so.73
The constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments can be
classified into two categories: (1) the right to informational
privacy that involves protecting private personal matters from
government intrusion such as medical records and electronic
information, and (2) the right to decisional privacy that prevents
government interference in personal decision making such as
marital decisions, child rearing, and intimate personal relations,
each of which the Supreme Court as discussed in several
different cases.74
A.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding the Right to
Informational Privacy and the Right to Decisional Privacy

Regarding the first category, there are three Supreme Court
cases that explicitly deal with the constitutional right to
informational privacy: Whalen v. Roe, Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, and NASA v. Nelson.75 The constitutional right
to informational privacy can be defined as the right of a person to
control the disclosure of his or her personal matters, as
articulated in Whalen.76
Nixon further cultivated the
constitutional right to informational privacy in the context of
presidential recordings.77 Moreover, Nelson acknowledged that
there is some constitutional protection for personal information
but not under the circumstances of that case.78 However, the
Court in Nelson was reluctant to clearly state whether the right
to informational privacy is a fundamental right, thereby causing
confusion on whether strict scrutiny applies to a government
intrusion into the right to informational privacy.79

73
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2253 (Alito, J., dissenting); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 583, 598–600 (1977).
75
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–600;
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); see also Fan, supra note 22,
at 968–69.
76
429 U.S. at 598–600.
77
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 456–57.
78
Nelson, 562 U.S. at 158–59.
79
Fan, supra note 22, at 982; see also Nelson, 562 U.S. at 158–59.
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The second category, the right to decisional privacy, stems
from Griswold v. Connecticut and is bolstered by Obergefell v.
Hodges, along with other cases.80 This line of cases cements the
constitutional right to decisional privacy as fundamental, and
any governmental intrusion into this privacy right is subject to
strict scrutiny.81 The right to privacy comprises both the rights
to informational privacy and decisional privacy; therefore, if
decisional privacy is fundamental and of equal importance to
personal liberty as informational privacy, the right to
informational privacy should also be regarded as a fundamental
right subject to strict scrutiny.82
Scholars attribute Whalen v. Roe as the Supreme Court’s
first recognition of the right to informational privacy.83 Issued in
1977, a few years after the decisional privacy case Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court delivered its opinion with the backdrop of
recognizing fundamental rights inherent in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, including both
aspects of the constitutional right to privacy.84
Whalen considered the New York State Controlled
Substances Act, which required disclosing to a government
agency the names and addresses of each person who obtained
certain drugs through a physician’s prescription.85 The purpose
of the law was to track whether certain drugs were being
diverted into a black market through corrupt pharmacists
refilling prescriptions for unwitting patients.86
However,

80
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); see ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1; Goldman, supra
note 62, at 604–05.
81
Fallon, supra note 60, at 1283.
82
Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67 (stating that informational privacy has always
been linked to decisional privacy because they have “the common concern of state
interference with autonomy of choice”); see also Fallon, supra note 60, at 1283.
Professor Fan also quotes District Court Judge Robert L. Carter, who stated:
The concept of privacy is an affirmation of the importance of certain aspects
of the individual and his desired freedom from needless outside
interference. It is sometimes described as a sphere of space that a man may
carry with him which is protected from unwarranted outside intrusion, as
the right of selected disclosures about oneself and as a right of personal
autonomy.
Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67.
83
429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977); see also Fan, supra note 22, at 955.
84
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Whalen, 429 U.S. at
598–99; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
85
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
86
Id. at 591–92.
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patients believed that disclosure of their names, even though
only to a government agency, would be damaging to their
reputation by stigmatizing them as drug addicts.87 A group of
patients challenged the statute as a violation of their
“constitutionally protected rights of privacy.”88
Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion and found
that there are two different kinds of privacy interests provided by
the Constitution.89 Specifically, he stated that “[o]ne is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”
construed as the right to informational privacy, “and another is
the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions,” construed as the right to decisional
privacy.90
Further, the Court found that the right to
informational privacy is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.91 Moreover, the Court enacted a balancing test
between the health of the community to prevent prescription
drugs from falling into the black market and the patients’ right
to informational privacy.92 After balancing the benefits of the
statute with the invasion on the patients’ privacy rights, the
Court held that the statute’s disclosure requirements did not
constitute an impermissible invasion on “any right or liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”93
Justice Stevens cited Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead
v. United States in stating that there is a right to informational
privacy.94 Olmstead was a telephone wiretapping case in which
the Court held there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment
where law enforcement does not trespass on a person’s
property.95
Justice Brandeis emphatically stated that the
Constitution provides the “right to be let alone,” or to be free
from government intrusion.96 Seizing on this language, the Court
in Whalen established the right to informational privacy.97
87

Id. at 595.
Id. at 591.
89
Id. at 599–600.
90
Id. at 599–600.
91
Id. at 603–04.
92
Id. at 602.
93
Id. at 603–04.
94
Id. at 599 n.25 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928)
(Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
95
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468.
96
Id. at 478.
97
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599; see supra note 71 (discussing that Olmstead was
eroded over decades and overturned by Katz).
88
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In his concurrence in Whalen, Justice Brennan stated that
the statute discloses patients’ personal information to only a
small number of state health officials with a legitimate interest
in the information.98 However, Justice Brennan argued that
disclosure to a wide array of people “would clearly implicate
constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably
be justified only by compelling state interests.”99 The use of
“compelling state interest” language implies that the right to
informational privacy is subject to strict scrutiny.100 Thus, the
majority opinion set the precedent by establishing the
constitutional right to informational privacy, and Justice
Brennan further stated that the right to informational privacy is
subject to strict scrutiny, implicitly establishing the right to
informational privacy as fundamental, like its decisional privacy
counterpart.101
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, decided a few
months after Whalen, the Court dealt with releasing President
Nixon’s recordings that were made during his presidency.102
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court regarding
whether the release of the recordings violated President Nixon’s
constitutional privacy interests.103
President Nixon was
compelled to release the recordings to the Administrator of
General Services under the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act (“Act”).104 Further, the Administrator
was to screen the recordings for personal information regarding
the President and only release recordings that were pertinent to
the public.105 In light of this screening process, Justice Brennan
found that President Nixon’s privacy interest in his personal
communications was outweighed by the compelling state interest
in having recordings pertinent to the public be released using the
the strict scrutiny rubric.106 That is, Justice Brennan stated that
the Act’s screening process was narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling state interest and that it attempted to keep President

98

Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
100
See id. at 606–07.
101
Id. at 603–04 (majority opinion), 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102
433 U.S. 425, 429 (1977).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 433.
105
Id. at 455, 463.
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Id. at 465.
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Nixon’s personal recordings private.107 Thus, Justice Brennan
further cemented the right to informational privacy and its
status as a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny.108 Any
government intrusion on the right to informational privacy,
therefore, must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.109
In NASA v. Nelson, contract employees sued NASA for
requiring a background check for employment, alleging that it
invaded their constitutional right to informational privacy.110
Justice Alito, in delivering the opinion for the Court, was
reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional right to informational
privacy, stating “we will assume for present purposes that the
Government’s challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of
constitutional significance.”111 Further, Justice Alito found that
the Government did not have the “constitutional burden to
demonstrate that its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least
restrictive means of furthering its interests.”112 Instead, Justice
Alito enacted a less exacting balancing test, weighing the
Government’s interest in employing reliable workers that
perform functions critical to NASA’s mission against the workers’
right of informational privacy.113 As a result, the Court held,
based on this balancing test, that the Government’s background
check did not violate the contract employees’ right to
informational privacy.114 Thus, Nelson established that the right
to informational privacy may be subject to less than strict
scrutiny.115
However, as described herein, there are two further reasons
the right to informational privacy should be a fundamental right,
the government intrusion of which should be subject to strict
scrutiny. First, the right to decisional privacy is equal in
constitutional importance to the right to informational privacy,
and if decisional privacy is a fundamental right, so must be
informational privacy.116
Second, recent Supreme Court
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 456–57.
See id. at 456–57, 465.
See id.
562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 153.
See id. at 150–51.
Id. at 159.
See id. at 150.
See Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67.
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decisions regarding constitutional privacy protections of mobile
device data can be construed to elevate the right to informational
privacy to a fundamental right, such that any government
intrusion is subject to strict scrutiny.117
Discussions of decisional privacy led to Griswold v.
Connecticut, in which individuals challenged a Connecticut
statute that made it a crime for a physician to provide
contraceptives, even to married couples.118 Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, found that the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments provided a constitutional right to privacy to protect
governmental intrusion into a person’s private decisions.119
Further, the Court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny in view
of its violation of the constitutional right to decisional privacy.120
The Court found that the statue swept “unnecessarily broadly” to
“control or prevent [contraceptive] activities.”121 Justice Harlan,
in his concurrence, adhered the notion that the decisional privacy
right to contraception is a fundamental right by stating that the
Connecticut statute violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.122
In Obergefell v. Hodges, same-sex couples were given the
right to marry.123 The Supreme Court case consolidated cases
from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee.124
Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and found that
“[o]ver time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that
the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process
Clause.”125 Further, Justice Kennedy stated that “the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with
equal force to same-sex couples.”126 In addition, the Court held
“there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage.”127 Finally, Justice Kennedy stated

117
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
118
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
119
Id. at 484–85.
120
Id. at 485.
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Id.
122
Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
123
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
124
Id. at 2593.
125
Id. at 2598.
126
Id. at 2599.
127
Id. at 2608.
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It would misunderstand these men and women to say they
disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do
respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its
fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to
live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest
institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.
The Constitution grants them that right.128

There are other Supreme Court cases that establish the right
to decisional privacy as a fundamental right subject to strict
scrutiny.129 Further, Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan in
Whalen established that the right to informational privacy is as
constitutionally important as the right to decisional privacy.130
The confusion in the current judicial landscape stems from
Justice Alito’s application of a scrutiny less than strict in Nelson
without distinguishing it from Whalen and Nixon.131 However, as
described herein, Justice Alito’s view of the right to informational
privacy contravenes previous Supreme Court jurisprudence.132
Moreover, recent Supreme Court case law provides clarity by
holding that mobile device data requires heightened
constitutional protection, likely elevating the right to
informational privacy with regard to mobile device data to a
fundamental right.133
B. Recent Supreme Court Cases Regarding the Constitutional
Privacy Protections of Mobile Device Data Bolster Right to
Informational Privacy as Fundamental Right
Although there has been no specific Supreme Court case
dealing with the constitutional right to informational privacy
with regard to mobile device data, the Supreme Court has dealt
with the warrantless search of mobile devices, albeit not at the
border.134 In Riley v. California, David Leon Riley was stopped
by the police while driving his vehicle with expired registration

128

Id.
See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1.
130
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (majority opinion), 606 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (1977).
131
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 150 (2011); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607
(Brennan, J., concurring).
132
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Fan, supra note
22, at 966–67.
133
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
134
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
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tags.135 During the traffic stop, the police found that Riley was
driving under a suspended license.136 As a matter of standard
operating procedure, the police impounded Riley’s vehicle.137
During an inventory search of the vehicle, police found two
concealed firearms that led to Riley’s arrest for being in
possession of them.138 Upon a warrantless search of Riley’s
person incident to arrest, the police seized a mobile phone and
personal effects that indicated Riley’s gang affiliation.139 The
police continued searching the contents of the mobile phone and
found photographs of Riley in front of a car that was involved in
a shooting a few weeks earlier.140 Riley was charged with the
earlier shooting based at least in part due to the evidence found
from the search of his mobile phone.141 Riley moved to suppress
the evidence found on his mobile phone on the basis that it was
found through a warrantless search.142 The trial court denied the
motion, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.143
Chief Justice Roberts issued the majority opinion that
stated, based on Supreme Court precedent, that the purpose of a
warrantless search incident to arrest is to remove any weapons
that pose a threat to law enforcement and to prevent the
destruction of evidence.144 Further, Chief Justice Roberts stated
that “we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of
search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ”145 Thus, the
Court subjected the government intrusion of a warrantless
search of mobile device data incident to an arrest to heightened
scrutiny.146
In addition, the Court addressed the basis for the search
incident to arrest exception by stating “[d]igital data stored on a
cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Riley, 573 U.S. at 378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 379–80.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381–83.
Id. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
Fallon, supra note 60, at 1283; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–86.
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officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”147 Further, the
Court found that law enforcement officers can conduct a
warrantless search of a mobile phone to determine that no
weapons are hidden within it.148 However, once it is determined
that the mobile phone is not hiding any weapons, there is no
need to conduct a warrantless search of the data on the mobile
phone to ensure officer safety.149 Further, Chief Justice Roberts
addressed the other aspect of the search incident to arrest
doctrine by stating that “once law enforcement officers have
secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee
himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the
phone.”150
Thus, the underlying rationale of the search incident to
arrest doctrine is to allow a warrantless search incident to an
arrest to find weapons in order to protect law enforcement
officers and to prevent the destruction of evidence.151 The Court
held in Riley that any further search, including a search of the
data accessible via a mobile phone, requires a search warrant
based on probable cause because a mobile phone is not simply a
communication device but can contain the most intimate details
of a person’s life.152 These kinds of intimate details are ones that
require heightened constitutional protection.153
In Carpenter v. United States, law enforcement officials were
gathering location information for Carpenter, which was
provided by his mobile phone to cell towers in Michigan and
Ohio.154 Using the location information collected, without a
warrant, from the cell phone carrier, law enforcement officers
were able to place Carpenter at several robberies.155 Carpenter
moved to suppress the location information as a violation of his
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.156

147

Riley, 573 U.S. at 387.
Id. (“to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone
and its case”).
149
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Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court,
holding that although Carpenter provided his location
information to the third-party cell phone carrier, such location
information was so integral to ascertaining his constant
whereabouts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his location information under the Fourth Amendment.157 Thus,
law enforcement officers were required to obtain a warrant prior
to gathering the location information regarding Carpenter’s cell
phone from the cell phone carrier.158
The Court found that because location information of a
mobile device is so intimate, it requires heightened constitutional
protection.159 Although, as in Riley, Carpenter implicates the
Fourth Amendment, the Court, citing Justice Brandeis’s dissent
from Olmstead, found that an individual’s privacy in his mobile
device data—particularly location information—should not be
eroded through technological advances in government
surveillance.160 Further, Chief Justice Roberts cited Justice
Brandeis’s dissent from Olmstead to find that a person has the
“right to be let alone” from government intrusion, further
justifying mobile device data as meriting heightened
constitutional protection from government intrusion.161
In the context of searches incident to arrest, the Court has
held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant prior to
searching mobile device data.162 However, in the context of a
border search, the Court has not yet opined on whether the
Fourth Amendment provides constitutional protections from a
warrantless government search of mobile device data at the
border.163 Further, lower courts have held that the border search
exception allows law enforcement to search mobile device data
without obtaining a warrant.164
Allowing a warrantless border search of mobile device data
contravenes the constitutional protections of mobile device data
found in both Riley and Carpenter.165 If the Fourth Amendment
157

Id. at 2221–22.
Id. at 2221.
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Id. at 2217
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Id. at 2223.
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Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J. dissenting)).
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is not capable of providing these constitutional protections, then
the Fifth Amendment may be.166 That is, although a warrantless
border search of mobile device data may be constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment, the same warrantless border search can
infringe on the right to informational privacy.167 Such a rationale
is in line with Justice Roberts’s rationale and citation to Justice
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead, which is the same line of
jurisprudence from which the right of informational privacy was
born.168
C. The Right to Informational Privacy for Mobile Device Data is
a Fundamental Right Requiring Strict Scrutiny
Any government intrusion of the fundamental right to
informational privacy is subject to strict scrutiny for three
reasons. First, the right to informational privacy is of equal
constitutional importance to the right to decisional privacy.169
Thus, if the Supreme Court jurisprudence finds that decisional
privacy is a fundamental right, it follows that informational
privacy is also a fundamental right.170 Second, the recent
Supreme Court cases Riley and Carpenter have found that mobile
device data receives heightened constitutional privacy
protection.171
Third, the Carpenter rationale for requiring
heightened protection for mobile device data stems from the
same Supreme Court jurisprudence as the right to informational
privacy.172 Therefore, if mobile device data requires heightened
constitutional protection and the right to informational privacy
covers mobile device data, then the right to privacy vis-à-vis
mobile device data is a fundamental right.173
Supreme Court jurisprudence for the right to informational
privacy—found in cases from Whalen through Nixon to
Nelson—has vacillated between strict scrutiny and something
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Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2223; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474–76.
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See Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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less, thereby creating confusion about whether informational
privacy is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.174 However,
the right to decisional privacy, akin to the right to informational
privacy, enjoys the status of a fundamental right175 Supreme
Court jurisprudence relating to the right to decisional privacy
starts with Griswold v. Connecticut and continues through Roe v.
Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges, among others.176 This line of
cases establishes that any government intrusion on the
constitutional right to decisional privacy must be subject to strict
scrutiny.177 The right of informational privacy is likely of equal
constitutional importance as the right to decisional privacy
because they stem from the same concern by the Supreme Court
about state interference in an invidual’s right to make choices
about her own life.178 Thus, like the right to decisional privacy,
the right to informational privacy should be considered a
fundamental right, any government intrusion of which is subject
to strict scrutiny.179
Moreover, the recent Supreme Court cases Riley and
Carpenter hold that mobile device data can store such intimate
details of a person’s life that it requires constitutional protection
from government intrusion.180 While both Riley and Carpenter
consider mobile device data through a Fourth Amendment lens,
the Supreme Court has held in both cases that mobile device
data requires heightened constitutional protection based on the
ubiquity of cell phones in daily life.181
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Further, Chief Justice Roberts, in Carpenter, noted that
constitutional privacy protection for mobile device data has its
roots in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead, as did Justice
Stevens in Whalen, when he recognized the constitutional right
to informational privacy.182 Justice Brandeis wrote that the
Constitution provides the “right to be let alone” stemming from
the Fifth Amendment.183 Further, Justice Brandeis explained
that personal privacy and personal liberty are so intertwined
that “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other.”184 The portion of Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead
that Chief Justice Roberts cited to lay the foundation for mobile
device data’s heightened protection is the same portion that
provided the basis for informational privacy.185 Therefore, the
right to informational privacy for mobile device data should be
recognized as a fundamental right requiring heightened
constitutional protection.186
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT RULINGS SHOULD ASSUAGE SOME
LEGAL COMMENTATORS’ RELUCTANCE TO FIND THAT A
GOVERNMENT INTRUSION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY
After Nelson, some legal commentators questioned whether
the right to informational privacy is a fundamental right.187
Further, some legal commentators questioned whether there is a
constitutional right to privacy at all due to Justice Scalia’s and
Justice Thomas’s concurrences in that case, which deny that such
a right is protected by the Constitution.188 However, other legal
scholars do accept that the Constitution provides a right to
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informational privacy, but they find that any government
intrusion of such a right is not subject to strict scrutiny and
instead, they put forth that a right to informational privacy is
subject to some form of intermediate scrutiny.189
An oft-cited argument that a right to informational privacy
does not exist is the cliché that there is no such explicit right
stated in the Constitution.190 However, this belief is hypocritical
at best, as the Court has recognized time and again that the right
to decisional privacy—akin to the right to informational
privacy—is also not explicitly stated in the Constitution, but is a
fundamental right nonetheless.191
Another reason for the
reluctance to acknowledge the right to informational privacy is
the existence of only three Supreme Court cases on the issue:
Whalen, Nixon, and Nelson.192 A further reason for reluctance is
that in each of those three cases, the party asserting the right
failed to vindicate the right because of a compelling government
interest.193 Moreover, these three cases apply varying levels of
scrutiny, ranging from strict scrutiny to a simple balancing test
of a person’s interest against the government’s interest.194
However, given federal jurisprudence with regard to the
right to informational privacy and the recent Supreme Court
cases with regard to mobile device data, legal commentators
should be more willing to accept that the right to informational
privacy for mobile device data is a fundamental right.195 Lower
federal courts have continued to hold that a right to
informational privacy exists, and the Supreme Court has refused
to grant certiorari in any of these cases, which may implicitly
acknowledge that a right to informational privacy exists.196
These cases range from enjoining the Department of Defense and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development from asking
189
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employees about their drug use and financial history to
preventing the revelation of the HIV status of prison inmates or
the personal details of rape victims.197 This all suggests that the
lower federal courts find that some sort of right to informational
privacy exists.198
Further, legal commentators should analyze the Supreme
Court cases directly addressing the right to informational
privacy, not in a vacuum, but against the backdrop of other
relevant Supreme Court cases.199 Riley and Carpenter have
found heightened constitutional protection of mobile device
data.200 In Riley, the Court found that mobile devices store and
have access to the most intimate details of a person’s life, such
that law enforcement officers cannot freely search their contents
without a warrant.201 In Carpenter, the Court again found that
location information of a mobile device contains intimate details
of a person’s life.202 A mobile device, such as a mobile phone, is in
a person’s possession constantly in his everyday life. Thus, the
location information of a mobile device is the location information
of the person.203
Such intimate details are held to be
constitutionally protected from law enforcement officers who
wish to freely search the phone’s contents without a warrant.204
In addition, Riley and Carpenter both found that mobile
device data contains the most private details of a person’s life.205
Thus, the Court held in both Riley and Carpenter that any search
of mobile device data requires a warrant.206 In Supreme Court
jurisprudence, where the Fourth Amendment falls short, the
Fifth Amendment can protect the right.207 The Court found in
both Riley and Carpenter that mobile device data is afforded
heightened constitutional protection; therefore, cell phone data
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falls under the protection of the informational privacy right, and
any government intrusion on this constitutionally protected
privacy interest must be subject to strict scrutiny.208
Thus, with lower federal courts acknowledging the right to
informational privacy and the Supreme Court implying as such,
in addition to the recent Supreme Court cases holding that
mobile device data merits heightened constitutional protection,
legal commentators should find that the right to informational
privacy, at least as it pertains to mobile device data, is a
fundamental right, any government intrusion of which must be
subject to strict scrutiny.209
V. DHS RULES CALLING FOR WARRANTLESS BORDER SEARCH OF
MOBILE DEVICE DATA ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
As discussed herein, the right to informational privacy, at
least as it pertains to mobile device data, is a fundamental right,
and any government intrusion on it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.210 That is, the government intrusion must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.211
DHS rules that allegedly allow CBP officials to conduct a
warrantless border search of mobile device data can be construed
as a government intrusion on the right to informational privacy
for mobile device data.212 The compelling government interest for
such a government intrusion, as indicated by the DHS rules, is
national security, specifically protecting the country from
terrorists.213 The DHS empowers CBP officials to search a
United States citizen’s mobile device data without a warrant at
the border to ferret out terrorists.214 The rationale is that
searching emails, social media, and other electronic data stored
on, or accessible from, a person’s mobile device would indicate
208
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whether the person has a terrorist ideology.215 There is no doubt
that national security, including identifying terrorists entering
our country, is a compelling government interest.216
However, such a government intrusion should be subject to
strict scrutiny that it is narrowly tailored to the compelling
government interest.217 Unfettered access to and search of
mobile device data is not a narrowly tailored government
intrusion.218 Such a government intrusion leaves a United States
citizen’s constitutionally protected right to informational privacy
at the whim of CBP officials, a situation that can lead to tyranny,
as suggested by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Montoya de
Hernandez.219 Further, such an overbroad government intrusion
chills the freedom of speech, as citizens will be less likely to
speak out against the government in their emails or social media
if they know that CBP officials have unfettered access to this
mobile device data every time they reenter the country from
abroad.220 This chilling of political speech is against the nation’s
founding values.221
Thus, warrantless border searches of mobile device data
must be narrowly tailored to stave off government tyranny and
refrain from chilling political speech.222 One way to narrowly
tailor the warrantless border search of mobile device data and
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cure the unconstitutional government intrusion is to simply
require CBP officials to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a
border search of mobile device data.223 Having an independent
magistrate decide, a priori, whether the border search is
constitutional inherently restricts the number of persons whose
mobile device data is subject to a border search, thereby narrowly
tailoring the government intrusion of warrantless border
searches of mobile device data.224 Moreover, a warrant must be
based on probable cause.225 Therefore, CBP officials would not be
able to conduct border searches of mobile device data of persons
that they only reasonably suspect or have no reason to suspect to
pose a national security risk, but only those that they have
probable cause to suspect to be a terrorist.226 Hence, the pool of
potential persons subject to a border search would shrink,
thereby narrowly tailoring the government intrusion of a border
search.227
CONCLUSION
DHS rules have been promulgated to allow CBP officials to
conduct warrantless searches of mobile device data at the border
of United States citizens returning to the country under the
border search exception doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.
Such a warrantless border search likely violates the fundamental
right to informational privacy for mobile device data, as the right
to informational privacy for mobile device data is a fundamental
right for three reasons. First, the right to informational privacy
is akin to the right to decisional privacy, which has been
established as a longstanding fundamental right by Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
Moreover, the right to informational
privacy for mobile device data is of equal importance as the right
to decisional privacy. Thus, if the right to decisional privacy is a
fundamental right, then logic follows that the right to
informational privacy is also a fundamental right. Second, recent
Supreme Court cases have held that mobile device data should be
subject to heightened constitutional protection.
Third, the
Supreme Court’s rationale for holding mobile device data to
require heightened constitutional protection stems from the same
223
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Supreme Court jurisprudence that produced the right of
informational privacy. Therefore, if mobile device data requires a
heightened level of constitutional protection and the right to
informational privacy includes mobile device data, then the right
to informational privacy for mobile device data should also be
considered fundamental.
Consequently, if the right to informational privacy for mobile
device data is deemed to be a fundamental right, then any
government intrusion on that right is subject to strict scrutiny.
That is, the government intrusion must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest. Analyzing warrantless
border searches of mobile device data under this judicial rubric,
the compelling government interest relating to warrantless
border searches is national security. That is, CBP officials
search mobile device data to ferret out terrorists. The hope is
that searching mobile device data reveals a person’s terrorist
ideology through the search of emails, social media profiles, and
more. However, a warrantless border search of mobile device
data is not the most narrowly tailored government intrusion on
this compelling government interest. Instead, obtaining a search
warrant based on probable cause from an independent judicial
officer would be more narrowly tailored. Requiring a search
warrant provides a mechanism to avoid the potential of searching
any and all United States citizens’ mobile device data and focuses
the border search of mobile device data of United States citizens
that CBP officials have probable cause to believe may have a
terrorist ideology. Otherwise, the warrantless border search of
mobile device data of potentially all United States citizens would
chill political speech through a tyrannical invasion of
constitutionally protected privacy interests because of its
overbroad government intrusion.

